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Abstract: Since the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, nuclear regulators have strengthened safety standards or decided to decommission the nuclear power plant. The vast majority of
radiation is from nuclear power plants, so safety measures are also concentrated in nuclear power
plants. Radioactive materials located much closer to the people are scattered around the nation.
However, it is difficult for citizens to predict the radiation risk around them because regulatory
agencies do not provide adequate information on radiation. The main goal of this study is to analyze
the spatial distribution patterns of radioactive materials that serve as indicators for potential risk
from a radiological hazard. The empirical findings in this study demonstrate the presence of spatial
autocorrelation for the number of radiation licenses among 244 regions in the Republic of Korea. The
policy implications are three-fold: (1) it is necessary to improve regulatory governance in consideration of permitted use; (2) the regional offices of regulatory agency can be established based on the
identified spatial distribution of permitted use; (3) it is required to improve the information-disclosure
system for materials. This study provides an opportunity to create a safer society by understanding
the radiation around the public in general.
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1. Introduction
After the Chernobyl nuclear power plant explosion in the former Soviet Union in 1986,
there were no major accidents at nuclear power plants around the world. Consequently,
the perception that nuclear power plants were safe even among experts was widespread.
However, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant accident triggered a global re-evaluation
of nuclear power and radiation hazards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA,
hereafter), as well as nuclear regulators, have heightened the standards for nuclear safety.
Additionally, many countries have reformulated their policy to decommission nuclear
power plants. In the case of South Korea (Korea, hereafter), the ‘Nuclear Safety Act’ was
enacted in October 2011 by choosing to switch to a management system that can strengthen
safety, and the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC, hereafter) under the direct
control of the President was launched. As such, for the safety management of nuclear power
plants, each country is preparing multiple safety devices to prevent nuclear accidents or to
prepare for radiation leakage in the event of an accident. The regulatory system maintains
a cooperative system between the central and local governments, including regulatory
agencies. In the regulatory agency, safety supervision is usually performed by resident
experts through on-site offices. In addition, many people are starting to pay more attention
to radiation from nuclear power plants as well as the hazardous impacts of radiation on
human health. It becomes more important for safety agencies to fully disclose the relevant
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information through effective communication with citizens. For this reason, in the United
States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, hereafter) discloses all information about
nuclear energy and radioactive materials in accordance with the ‘Freedom of Information
Act’. Korea’s NSSC also discloses information held and managed by public institutions in
accordance with the ‘Official Information Disclosure Act’. However, these safety regulations
and new acts for information disclosure tend to focus on nuclear power plants because
the radiation risk from nuclear power plants is much greater than that of radioactive
materials [1]. While radiological hazards of nuclear power plants can be predicted due to
their spatial concentration in certain areas, radioisotopes utilizations are scattered among
sub-national regions (regions hereafter) around the nation, and it is difficult to identify
their locations, making it difficult for citizens to predict radiological hazards. Nevertheless,
regulatory agencies did not properly provide detailed information about radiation safety
compared to information on nuclear power plants.
The IAEA stated that regulators should set safety standards and ensure that emergency
management systems are established and maintained properly. The radiation hazards
associated with its use are not well known [2]. The release of radioactive contamination may
be inhaled and/or ingested as well as a result in the accidental external radiation exposure
to penetrating radiation [3]. In fact, as of December 2020, there have been 21 radiation
accidents reported in Korea over the past 5 years and 455 special cases in the process of
radiation safety management for workers in the radioactive utilization facilities over the
past 5 years (see Table 1) [4]. In recent years, accidents and exposures in radioisotopes
utilizations still continue.
Table 1. Radiation accidents in the last 5 years (2016–2020) in Korea 1 .
Accident Type

Theft/
Loss

Radiation
Exposure

Radioactive
Contamination

Fire

Equipment
Failure

Radiation
Release

ToxicGas

Total

Number of
Accidents

3

6

1

5

3

2

1

21

1

Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (2021).

In Korea, radiation risks are widespread among regions across the country, but radiation information, safety rules, and emergency response of regions are managed and
implemented by a central government agency, NSSC. On the other hand, in the United
States, NRC’s role is mainly granting the ownership of by-product materials and licenses
for the possession and use of by-products contained in certain items [5]. However, NRC’s
safety management is carried out separately in partnership with the state governments
that signed the agreement. In nuclear governance, the necessity of a governance system
in which all stakeholders participate in government-centered unilateral decision-making
was analyzed [6]. People may perceive radiation-related risks differently depending on
their interests and acceptable safety levels. Additionally, the size and the potential risk
from radiation hazards vary by region. However, regulatory policies are decided and
implemented by the central government in a top–down approach. This can be one of the
problems with the centralized governance structure, where the decision-making process
of policymakers or practitioners in safety management regulation for safety regulation
policies can lead to regulatory failure. A multi-layered structure is needed to effectively
secure the safety of nuclear power plants. For this, the active participation of scientists,
government agencies, nuclear power plant companies, civic groups, local residents, and
even local governments is important [7].
The elected officials of local governments are very interested in the safety and living environment of their local residents. Therefore, local governments want to actively participate
in radiation safety management practice and policy development. Can a central regulatory
agency effectively collaborate with local governments to manage the safety of radioactive
materials? Ultimately, by changing the top–down decision-making process of the central
agencies, a new governance system in nuclear safety regulation should be sought. This

Sustainability 2022, 14, 966

3 of 24

study aims to analyze the effectiveness of current nuclear safety regulations in Korea and
suggest alternative ways to enhance the public’s awareness of safety about radiation risks.
The main research question of this study is how radioactive material licenses and permitted
use are geographically distributed in Korea. More importantly, if distinctive geographic
distribution patterns exist among the regions of Korea, is it necessary to change the current
regulatory system to meet the local needs? The analytical results from spatial analyses on
radioactive material licenses in this study will be utilized as base evidence for regulatory
system reforms.
The geographic distribution of radioactive isotopes in Korea has rarely been studied,
and the data are rarely available for public use. Understanding the spatial distribution of
radioactive isotopes use in Korea is the first step to analyzing the potential risk among the
regions in Korea. This study utilizes spatial information that can identify local and regional
disparities [8]. For the sustainable and resilient management of radioactive risk, the first
step would be to develop a comprehensive database system about the spatial distribution of
radioactive materials. Based on the developed spatial analyses in this study, the utilization
of collected information/analytical results at the spatially disaggregated level can enhance
the effective management of radioactive risk through the collaborative policy development
between the central regulatory agency and local stakeholders.
In terms of re-evaluating social values or the role of the public, this study analyzes
the need to adjust the current regulatory governance in the direction of cooperation with
local governments rather than monopolizing regulatory safety management activities by
the central government’s regulatory bodies. This study’s main goal is to suggest viable
paths to improve the current regulatory governance system so that the improved system
can better maintain public safety from radioactive hazards across the country, enhance
the perceived safety level of residents, and ultimately increase the public’s acceptance of
radioactive material use in Korea.
2. Literature Review
The interest in research on nuclear safety policy has mainly focused on analyzing
policy’s role in the rapid growth of nuclear science and technology. Unlike the global trend
in which the nuclear power industry is declining due to major accidents such as the Three
Mile nuclear accident and the Chernobyl nuclear accident, the government’s support for
nuclear energy is being strengthened in Korea’s nuclear policy [9].
Existing literature on the nuclear safety regulatory system has mainly focused on
strengthening the independence of the nuclear safety regulatory agency. Regulatory independence is sometimes classified as legal independence and de facto independence [10].
Additionally, it is noteworthy that independent regulators have become socially valuable
organizations to implement regulatory governance and that such a phenomenon has spread
throughout the country. This concept of regulatory independence has been expanded more
recently [11]. These are the clear independence of the regulatory agency through the amendment of the law and the independence of the judiciary from intervening with the regulator.
In the nuclear sector, the independence of regulators is even more important [12]. The
reason for this is that at the time of the Fukushima nuclear accident, Japanese regulators
did not make independent decisions on nuclear safety and showed a pattern of regulatory
capture. [13]. The regulatory agency is dominated by nuclear power operators, which leads
to regulatory capture, which can lead to regulatory failure [14]. Operators also defined
regulatory capture as inducing regulators to hide safety information from the public. Many
studies on the independent activities of nuclear safety regulatory agencies suggest that it
is necessary to separate the ministries that are responsible for nuclear power generation
and those that regulate safety within the government [15]. The need for an independent
decision-making system of the regulatory body was suggested, as well as a stakeholder
participation system [16]. There are plenty of studies in nuclear energy safety regulations
in Korea. Among others, there are the following: a study on the independence of nuclear
safety regulations [17], a study on the ideal nuclear safety administrative system in terms
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of public administration [18], and a study examining the process of the separation of nuclear power promotion and safety [19]. As a more direct policy study, there were studies
that suggested enhancing the independence of nuclear safety regulations, strengthening
the supervision power of the National Assembly, diversifying the manpower of nuclear
safety regulatory agencies, and securing expertise to improve the nuclear safety regulation
system [20].
Among the studies on nuclear safety regulation, there were many studies on nuclear governance. The need to form governance through formal communication channels
with regulators, nuclear operators, and local governments was proposed [21]. In nuclear
governance, the necessity of a governance system in which all stakeholders participate
in a government-centered unilateral decision-making system was suggested [6]. It was
proposed to enact a law to ensure the expansion of local governments’ nuclear safety
organizations and the participation of local experts in the Nuclear Safety and Security
Committee [7].
What follows is a study of the acceptability of nuclear hazards. Among the factors
influencing the confirmed nuclear power acceptance, the effect of the reliability of the
regulatory body on the nuclear power acceptance was analyzed as the most important [22].
The necessity of an approach from technical and psychological aspects such as safety
culture for securing nuclear safety was presented [23]. A two-way process is required for
public communication about nuclear risks and nuclear accidents [24]. In particular, when
communicating risk, regulators need to know how to listen to the public, not just one-way
disclosure. Nuclear safety information management is important to verify and evaluate
compliance with regulatory requirements for safety in nuclear power plants [25].
Among the studies, studies on the safety culture of nuclear safety managers and
nuclear operators were included to analyze the causes of continuous accidents in nuclear
and radiation facilities. The term ‘safety culture’ was first mentioned in the OECD investigation report on the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 [26]. In 1991, IAEA defined
safety culture as ‘a set of characteristics and attitudes of organizations and individuals
that allow nuclear power plant safety issues to receive legitimate attention according to
their importance’ [27]. In the case of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the implicit social
culture in Japan inappropriately affected the safety culture and weakened the safety of
nuclear power plants [28]. A positive safety culture contributes to radiation safety and the
protection of human life [29].
There are many technical studies to ensure human safety with radiation generated
from nuclear power or radioactive materials. Nearly 90% of radiation-exposure cases in
the United States are due to the use of medical radiation [30]. There is also the possibility
that uncontrolled exposure to radiation will occur during radiation accidents and that such
exposures may go undetected. According to the effects of long-term exposure to low-dose
radiation on the human body, relevant information should be used to prepare NRC safety
standards [31].
Maintaining a balance between the potential risk of radiation and the use of radiation
is an important factor in establishing a radiation safety policy [32]. In particular, ALARA
(a reasonably low, achievable level) can be achieved through the leadership of management
and active participation of employees [33].
The IAEA stated that operators should fulfill their organizational and technical responsibilities for on-site safety in preparation for a radiological emergency, and regulatory
authorities should set safety standards and establish an emergency management system
in advance [2]. NRC emphasized the importance of information on radiation exposure
for establishing an accurate radiation policy [2,34]. Through this, NRC tried to compare
the radiation exposure to workers and the potential public risk and to establish necessary
policy alternatives [35]. In order to effectively achieve radiation safety, it is important that
many countries share international standards and technologies [36].
The purpose of spatial analysis is to support policy with spatially segmented
information [8]. Despite the spatially granular level of data, most policies are being for-
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materials [5]. Therefore, regulations on radiation safety are operated in a variety of forms,
such as being directly implemented by the regulatory agency, NRC, or in collaboration
with the regulatory agency, NRC, and state and local governments.
The Korean regulatory system for radioactive materials differs from the system of
the United States. Furthermore, in the case of the UK, the central government carries out
comprehensive regulatory works, and the local governments regulate RI registration and
license radioactive materials [45]. In France, the regulatory agency is in charge of all regulatory work, with some powers entrusted to local governments [46]. Conversely, in Canada,
the central government has regulatory authority, and site safety is managed through the
central government’s on-site regulatory offices [47]. As shown in these cases, the regulatory
activities for radioactive materials are rarely carried out solely by regulatory bodies but
more commonly by collaboration between regulatory bodies and local governments.
4. Method and Data
This study employs spatial data analysis for identifying the geographic distribution
patterns of the Radioactive Material License (both in number and in permitted use amount)
among the regions in Korea. For the analyses, two main variables are used to test the
two main hypotheses: (1) the number of Radioactive Material Licenses is randomly distributed among the regions in Korea, and (2) the permitted use amount of radioactive
materials is randomly distributed among the regions in Korea. The first law of geography
by Waldo Tobler [48], ‘everything is related to everything else, but near things are more
related than distant things’, is the base for the spatial autocorrelation (a distinctive spatial
distribution pattern) of a phenomenon. The use of radioactive materials in Korea is believed to be concentrated in regions where industrial clusters, R&D clusters, and population
clusters are found. The concentrated use in cluster forms can be linked to a potential risk to
the residents of the identified regions with the neighboring effects.
4.1. Sources and Characterization of the Variables
To analyze how radioactive material uses and the associated potential risk from radiation hazards are geographically distributed, spatial analysis is utilized with the analytical tool,
GeoDa software (for more information about GeoDa, visit http://geodacenter.github.io/,
accessed on 29 November 2021). The main variables include the location of local RI user
facilities, number of licenses by regions, and permitted use amount of radioactive materials
by regions in Korea. The main data source is ‘the radiation safety information system’ of
KINS. The data were extracted as of 10 May 2021. The total number of radioactive material
licenses used in the analysis was 11,656 licenses across Korea. It included 1221 mobile-use
sites. The total permitted amount of radioactive material use in Korea is 307,115,022,619
MBq (Megabecquerel). The main use types of radioactive materials are classified into the
following five categories: public use, educational and research use, military use, industrial
use, and medical use.
There is a total of 250 local governments in Korea, which is the spatial unit of observation for the analysis. This includes Si (equivalent to a city in the US), Gun (equivalent to
a county in the US but located outside city jurisdictions), and Gu (a district that is a part
of metropolitan cities in Korea). Among the 250 regions, six island regions (Ongjin-gun,
Sinan-gun, Jeju-si, Seogwipo-si, Wando-gun, and Ulleung-gun) were excluded from the
analysis in this study. These island regions are isolated from the mainland of the Korean
peninsula, and it is hard to build a plausible neighborhood structure with a weight matrix
for spatial analysis due to the isolated location of island regions. Therefore, a set of spatial
analyses is conducted based on radiation information in the 244 regions in Korea. Again,
the main data for analysis include the number of licenses and the permitted amount of
radioactive materials use in Korea. Depending on the use types, the number of licenses and
the permitted amount of radioactive materials use are summarized as shown in Table 2.
The total number of licenses among the 244 regions is 11,533, while the total amount of
permitted use is 306,273 TBq as of May 2021. The amount of permitted use is the best
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available indicator for the potential risk from radiation hazards. Accordingly, the main
analysis of this study focuses on the permitted use amount among the 244 regions of Korea,
and the key policy implications will be drawn from the spatial analysis on the permitted
use amount variable.
Table 2. Number and amount of radioactive material license by use type in Korea (May 2021 1 ).
Classification

Public

Education and
Research

Military

Industry

Medical

Total

Number of
License

Total
Excluded 6 regions
Sub Total

996
44
952

914
11
903

121
6
115

9173
34
9139

452
8
444

11,656
103
11,553

Amount of
License (TBq)

Total
Excluded 6 regions
Sub Total

18,444
0.006
18,444

64,830
399.9
64,430

1727
0
1727

178,598
0.001
178,598

43,516
441.9
43,074

307,115
841.8
306,273

1

The raw data are as of 10 May 2021. Source: ‘the radiation safety information system’ of KINS.

4.2. Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis
This study utilizes exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) to analyze the geographic
distribution of radioactive material use in Korea. Through ESDA, spatial distribution
patterns can be formally tested and explained, for the presence of spatial autocorrelation at
a global level (across Korea) and for the presence of spatial regions such as spatial clusters
(High–High or Low–Low) and spatial outliers (High–Low or Low–High) at the local level
(at each local region of Korea). It is explained that the ‘Global spatial autocorrelation
is determined by testing a null hypothesis of spatial randomness [8]’. Rejection of the
null hypothesis indicates a systematic spatial distribution pattern, indicating the presence
of spatial autocorrelation. Global spatial autocorrelation can be determined by testing
the null hypothesis of spatial randomness with Moran’s I test statistic. The rejection
of the null hypothesis means that the alternative hypothesis of spatial autocorrelation
is true and should be accepted. When spatial autocorrelation is formally detected, the
variable in interest exhibits distinctive spatial distribution patterns in space. Positive spatial
autocorrelation (with a positive and significant Moran’s I statistic) at the global level shows
a relative dominance of spatial clusters, whereas negative spatial autocorrelation (with a
negative and significant Moran’s I statistic) at the global level reveals a relative dominance
of spatial outliers [8].
A global spatial autocorrelation test with Moran’s I does not identify where the
distinctive spatial regions (either clusters or outliers) exist. Therefore, it is necessary to
check the location and significance of clusters and outliers at the local level. A method
called LISA (Local Indicators of Spatial Association) is developed to detect the locations of
each type of spatial pattern among the study regions. A LISA map shows the locations with
clusters (H–H or L–L) and outliers (H–L or L–H). LISA tests the presence of spatial clusters
and spatial outliers by comparing location similarity between two regions, i and j (defined
by a spatial weight matrix, Wij), and value similarity between an observed value in location
i and that in location j (defined by Cij = Zi × Zj). This study employs a distance-based
spatial weight matrix, four-nearest neighbors, which classifies the four nearest regions of a
subject region as neighbors and the rest as non-neighbors.
5. Results
In this section, the empirical estimation results from spatial analyses are explained.
Additionally, the policy implications drawn from the identified spatial patterns of potential
risk from the local use of radioactive materials are shared. The first part explains the
findings and their implications with the number of licenses variable, while the second part
explains the findings and their implications with the permitted amount of use variable.
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explains the findings and their implications with the permitted amount of use variable.5.1.
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The Number of Radioactive Materials Licenses
To understand the risk of geographically varying radioactive materials, this study
first analyzed the spatial distribution of radioactive material licenses in Korea. The null
5.1. The Number of Radioactive Materials Licenses
hypothesis is ‘The number of Radioactive Material Licenses is randomly distributed
To understand the risk of geographically varying radioactive materials, this study
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244 regionsisinrejected,
Korea’. Moran’s
for the number
of radioactive
materials
correlation is accepted.
Positive
and
significant
Moran’s
I
statistic
value
indicates
the
0.237 and statistically significant at 5% with the pseudo p-value of 0.000030. relConsequently,
ative dominance the
of null
spatial
clusters.
So, the and
number
of Radioactive
Material
Licenses
hypothesis
is rejected,
the alternative
hypothesis
of spatial
autocorrelation is
Positive andpatterns
significant
Moran’s
valuein
indicates
shows distinctive accepted.
spatial distribution
among
theI statistic
244 regions
Korea.the
Therelative
obser-dominance
spatial clusters.
So, thescatter
number
ofshown
Radioactive
Material
shows distinctive
vations in the firstofquadrant
of the Moran
plot
in Figure
2 areLicenses
the candidates
spatial
distribution
patterns
among
the
244
regions
in
Korea.
The
observations
for the High–High clusters (H–H clusters), but not all of them are found to be statistically in the first
quadrant
the Moran
scatter
plot shown
in Figure
2 are the
the candidates
the High–High
significant, and this
will beoftested
in LISA
statistics.
In H–H
clusters,
value of a for
subject
clusters (H–H clusters), but not all of them are found to be statistically significant, and this
region is higher than the overall average coupled with the average of its neighbors’ values
will be tested in LISA statistics. In H–H clusters, the value of a subject region is higher than
that is higher thanthethe
overall
average
value.
numbervalues
of licenses
in a than the
overall
average
coupled
withFor
theexample,
average ofifitsthe
neighbors’
that is higher
local region is higher
than
the average
ofexample,
all 244 regions,
and of
thelicenses
average
theregion
number
overall
average
value. For
if the number
in ain
local
is higher than
of licenses for its the
neighboring
regions
is
also
higher
than
the
average
of
all
regions.
average of all 244 regions, and the average in the number of licenses for itsIn
neighboring
regions
is also higher
thanregimes
the average
of all
In order
to H–L
identify
locations of
order to identify the
locations
of spatial
(H–H
or regions.
L–L clusters
and
or the
L–H
spatial regimes
(H–H or L–L clusters and H–L or L–H outliers), LISA statistics are needed.
outliers), LISA statistics
are needed.

(a)

(b)

Figure 2. Moran’s I Figure
Test Statistics
for Ithe
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radioactive
materials
licenses.
(a) Moran’s
I (a) Moran’s I
2. Moran’s
Testnumber
Statistics
the number
of radioactive
materials
licenses.
scatter plot for the number
of
radioactive
materials
(Moran’s
I
=
0.237);
(b)
Reference
distribution
scatter plot for the number of radioactive materials (Moran’s I = 0.237); (b) Reference distribution
for Moran’s I (pseudo
(Note:= TOT_LIC_N
= number
of radioactive
for p-value
Moran’s=I 0.000030).
(pseudo p-value
0.000030). (Note:
TOT_LIC_N
= numbermaterial
of radioactive material
licenses in a region;licenses
laggedin
TOT_LIC_N
= the
average number
of radioactive
licenses
in licenses in the
a region; lagged
TOT_LIC_N
= the average
number ofmaterial
radioactive
material
the neighboring regions
of
a
region.).
neighboring regions of a region.).

South Korea
is composed
of nine administrative
provinces
(‘do’
in Korea, equivalent
South Korea is composed
of nine
administrative
provinces (‘do’
in Korea,
equivalent
to
a
state
in
the
US)
and
eight
metropolitan
areas,
including
Seoul.
SMA (Seoul
to a state in the US) and eight metropolitan areas, including Seoul. The SMA (SeoulThe
Metis composed ofareas
two metropolitan
areas (Seoul
ropolitan Area) is Metropolitan
composed ofArea)
two metropolitan
(Seoul and Incheon)
andand
oneIncheon)
prov- and one
province (Gyeonggi-do). In total, there are 17 administrative regions, which are further
ince (Gyeonggi-do). In total, there are 17 administrative regions, which are further decomdecomposed into 250 smaller administrative regions. In this study, Korea is subdivided
posed into 250 smaller
administrative regions. In this study, Korea is subdivided into five
into five broader geographic divisions for policy development: the SMA, Chungcheong,
broader geographic
divisions
for policy
development:
the SMA,
Chungcheong,
GyeongGyeongsang, Jeolla,
and Gangwon,
as shown
in Figure
3.
sang, Jeolla, and Gangwon, as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure
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of either
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As a result
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local region.
As
LISAofanalysis
for the number
radioactive
material licenses,
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were
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result
LISA analysis
for the of
number
of radioactive
materialH–H
licenses,
H–H
clusters
found
within
the SMA
Metropolitan
Area; Pyeongtaek-si,
Danwon-gu,
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within(Seoul
the SMA
(Seoul Metropolitan
Area; Pyeongtaek-si,
Danwon-gu,
Anseong-si,
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the SMA (Cheonan-si,
si, Yeonsu-gu,
Namdong-gu),
industrialindustrial
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to theclose
SMAto(Cheonan-si,
Asan-si, and
Asan-si,
and Dangjin-si).
H–H
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found inKorea
Southeast
Korea (Uichang-gu
Dangjin-si).
Other H–H Other
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were
foundwere
in Southeast
(Uichang-gu
ChangwonChangwon-si,
Seongsan-gu
Changwon-si,
and Gimhae-si).
Theseare
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areeither
located
si, Seongsan-gu
Changwon-si,
and Gimhae-si).
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located
ineither
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the industrial
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in the adjacent
of Korean
industrial
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cluster cluster
or in the
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of Korean
industrial
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with high
populapopulation
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Onother
the other
hand,
the L–L
clusters
were
mainly
distributed
among
tion density.
On the
hand,
the L–L
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were
mainly
distributed
among
thethe
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in
Gangwon-do,
namely
Taebaek-si,
Sokcho-si,
Pyeongchang-gun,
Samcheok-si,
gions in
namely Taebaek-si, Sokcho-si, Pyeongchang-gun, Samcheok-si,
Jeongseon-gun,
Jeongseon-gun,Inje-gun,
Inje-gun,Goseong-gun,
Goseong-gun,and
andYangyang-gun
Yangyang-gunininthe
themountainous
mountainouspart
partofof
Korea.
Korea.Additionally,
Additionally,regions
regionsininGyeongsangbuk-do
Gyeongsangbuk-do(Andong-si,
(Andong-si,Yeongju-si,
Yeongju-si,MungyeongMungyeongsi,si,Yecheon-gun,
Yecheon-gun,Bonghwa-gun,
Bonghwa-gun,and
andUljin-gun),
Uljin-gun),Jeollabuk-do
Jeollabuk-do(Namwon-si,
(Namwon-si,Jangsu-gun,
Jangsu-gun,
and
andImsil-gun),
Imsil-gun),and
andKyeongsangnam-do
Kyeongsangnam-do(Hamyang-gun,
(Hamyang-gun,Geochang-gun,
Geochang-gun,and
andHapcheonHapcheongun)
were
found
in
the
L–L
cluster,
and
these
regions
are
rural
areas
with
concentrated
gun) were found in the L–L cluster, and these regions are rural areas with concentrated
agricultural
agriculturalactivities
activitiesand
andthe
thepresence
presenceofofa alarge
largeelderly
elderlypopulation.
population.These
Theseare
arethe
theregions
regions
with
limited
industrial
activities
due
to
their
geographical
characteristics.
In
other
with limited industrial activities due to their geographical characteristics. In otherwords,
words,
the
thehigher
higherconcentration
concentrationininthe
thenumber
numberofofradioactive
radioactivematerials
materialslicenses
licensesisismainly
mainlyfound
found
ininregions
industrial activities.
activities.Figure
Figure
also
regional
distribution
of
regionswith
with active
active industrial
4b4b
also
thethe
regional
distribution
of radiradioactive
materials
licenses.
As
expected,
the
regions
identified
as
the
upper
outliers
oactive materials licenses. As expected, the regions identified as the upper outliers (inde(independent
from
values
of their
neighbors)
mainly
cities
theSMA
SMA(Siheung-si,
(Siheungpendent from
values
of their
neighbors)
areare
mainly
thethe
cities
ininthe
si,Hwaseong-si,
Hwaseong-si,
Danwon-gu
of
Ansan-si,
etc.).
Additionally,
in
the
southeastern
state
Danwon-gu of Ansan-si, etc.). Additionally, in the southeastern state of
Koofrea
Korea
(Gyeongsangnam-do),
upper
outliers
have
the
highest
numbers
of
radioactive
(Gyeongsangnam-do), upper outliers have the highest numbers of radioactive matematerials licenses for the concentrated industrial activities for heavy industry, the chemical
rials licenses for the concentrated industrial activities for heavy industry, the chemical
industry, and the shipbuilding industry in the industrial clusters. They are mainly coastal
industry, and the shipbuilding industry in the industrial clusters. They are mainly coastal
regions: Nam-gu of Pohang-si, Ulju-gun, Nam-gu of Ulsan, Gimhae-si, Seongsan-gu of
regions: Nam-gu of Pohang-si, Ulju-gun, Nam-gu of Ulsan, Gimhae-si, Seongsan-gu of
Changwon-si, and Yeosu-si. Among the major inland cities, Gumi-si, Heungdeok-gu of
Changwon-si, and Yeosu-si. Among the major inland cities, Gumi-si, Heungdeok-gu of
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Cheongju-si, and
and Yuseong-gu
Cheongju-si,
Yuseong-gu show
showaahigher
higherconcentration
concentrationofoflicense
licensenumbers,
numbers,and
andthese
these
regions are the main center of industrial and R&D activities in Korea.
regions are the main center of industrial and R&D activities in Korea.
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Figure
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for the
thenumber
numberof
ofradioactive
radioactivematerials
materialslicenses.
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(a)LISA
LISAmap
mapfor
Figure 4.
4. LISA
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and box
for
the
number
of
radioactive
materials
licenses;
(b)
Box
plot
map
for
the
number
of
radioactive
the number of radioactive materials licenses; (b) Box plot map for the number of radioactive materials
materials licenses. (Note: TOT_LIC_N = number of radioactive material licenses in a region.).
licenses. (Note: TOT_LIC_N = number of radioactive material licenses in a region.).
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use for
for radioactive
radioactivematerials.
materials.Therefore,
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the
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permitted use
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However,KINS
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of permitted
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the public
its website.
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of permitted
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Accordingly,
better indicator for potential risk from radioactive hazards in case of emergencies. Accordthe current
information-disclosure
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permitted
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ingly,
the current
information-disclosure
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the public
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use amount
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Additionally,
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of facilities
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some
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with
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where
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application
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of the
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each
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application
approval
of the
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required
eachbusiness
business
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However,
in
the
case
of
a
mobile
use
workplace,
the
license
receivedat
establishment. However, in the case of a mobile use workplace, the license isisreceived
at the address of the head office due to the characteristic of temporary use. Due to the
the
address of the head office due to the characteristic of temporary use. Due to the inacinaccuracy of the KINS data, it is unavoidable to exclude license data for industrial use
curacy of the KINS data, it is unavoidable to exclude license data for industrial use from
from the spatial analysis for the number of licenses or for the permitted use amount of
the spatial analysis for the number of licenses or for the permitted use amount of radioacradioactive materials. So, this study analyzed the spatial distribution of the number of
tive materials. So, this study analyzed the spatial distribution of the number of licenses
licenses for radioactive materials, excluding licenses for industrial use. The Moran’s I is
for radioactive materials, excluding licenses for industrial use. The Moran’s I is 0.155 with
0.155 with a pseudo p-value of 0.000300, indicating the positive spatial autocorrelation
afor
pseudo
p-value
0.000300,
indicating the
positiveexcluding
spatial autocorrelation
for the numthe number
of of
licenses
for radioactive
materials,
licenses for industrial
use
ber
of
licenses
for
radioactive
materials,
excluding
licenses
for
industrial
use
(see Figure 5). Compared to the Moran’s I statistics of 0.237 (z-value of 5.9619) for(see
theFigure
total
5).
Compared
to thethe
Moran’s
I statistics
of for
0.237
(z-value of
5.9619) excluding
for the total
number
number
of licenses,
number
of licenses
radioactive
materials
licenses
forof
licenses,
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number
of
licenses
for
radioactive
materials
excluding
licenses
for
industrial
industrial use shows a weaker positive spatial autocorrelation with a lower Moran’s I of
use
shows
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positive
with a pattern
lower Moran’s
of 0.155by
(z0.155
(z-value
of 4.0654).
This spatial
reveals autocorrelation
that the spatial cluster
becomesI weaker
value
of
4.0654).
This
reveals
that
the
spatial
cluster
pattern
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by
excluding
excluding the number of licenses for industrial use, entailing the intrinsic data inaccuracy
the
number
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for industrial
use, entailing
the intrinsic data inaccuracy issues due
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due toofthe
identified
spatial mismatch
problems.
to the identified spatial mismatch problems.
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trial use (Moran’s I = 0.155); (b) Reference distribution for Moran’s I (pseudo p-value = 0.000300).
(Note: TLN_EX_IN = number of radioactive material licenses excluding industrial use in a region;
(Note: TLN_EX_IN = number of radioactive material licenses excluding industrial use in a region;
lagged TLN_EX_IN = the average number of radioactive material licenses excluding industrial use
lagged TLN_EX_IN = the average number of radioactive material licenses excluding industrial use in
in the neighboring regions of a region.).
the neighboring regions of a region.).

AALISA
in Figure
Figure6)6)ofofthe
thenumber
number
licenses
radioactive
materials
LISA map
map (shown
(shown in
ofof
licenses
forfor
radioactive
materials
excluding
industrial
licenses
shows
the
similar
geographic
distribution
of
L–L
clusters
excluding industrial licenses shows
geographic distribution of L–L clusters to
to the
for the
number
of licenses.
On other
the other
hand,
clusters
found
for
totaltotal
number
of licenses.
On the
hand,
moremore
H–HH–H
clusters
werewere
found
for the
for the number
of licenses
excluding
industrial
thanfor
those
total licenses.
In the
number
of licenses
excluding
industrial
use thanuse
those
totalfor
licenses.
In the LISA
map
LISA
map
excluding
industrial
use,
there
were
16
H–H
clusters,
mainly
found
in
the
excluding industrial use, there were 16 H–H clusters, mainly found in the metropolitan areas
metropolitan
such
as Daejeon
Metro, Sejong-si,
Cheongju-si
centers).
such
as Daejeonareas
Metro,
Sejong-si,
and Cheongju-si
(R&D and
centers).
However,(R&D
the spatial
distriHowever,
the
spatial
distribution
of
the
L–L
clusters
shows
similar
patterns
between
bution of the L–L clusters shows similar patterns between the two cases. Additionally, five
the two cases. Additionally, five regions (Chuncheon-si, Jinju-si, Gyeongju-si, Yuseongregions
(Chuncheon-si, Jinju-si, Gyeongju-si, Yuseong-gu, and Heungdeok-gu) appeared as
gu, and Heungdeok-gu) appeared as upper outliers in terms of the number of permits
upper outliers in terms of the number of permits excluding industrial use. Chuncheon-si
excluding industrial use. Chuncheon-si and Jinju-si had the highest number of licenses
and Jinju-si had the highest number of licenses when the industrial-use licenses were exwhen the industrial-use licenses were excluded, and these two regions are home to National
cluded,
andHospitals.
these two regions are home to National University Hospitals.
University
This study investigated the issues of KINS raw data with industrial licenses, which
may mislead the analytical results. Another main source of data inaccuracy is the mismatch
between the address of the RI mobile-use permit and the address of the actual site for
mobile use. There are 1118 industrial mobile-use sites among the 244 regions in the
analysis. Mobile-use sites give permission to handle radioactive material with storage
capacity. However, the radiation risk could not be accurately analyzed with the storage
capacity. However, NSSC [4] showed that the exposure accidents of workers at industrial
mobile-use sites are higher than that at the other type of facilities for a ten-year period
(2011–2020). Therefore, a spatial analysis for the number of industrial mobile-use sites
was conducted. The statistically significant and positive Moran’s I statistics of 0.165
(pseudo p-value at 0.001910), as shown in Figure 7a,b, confirms the presence of spatial
autocorrelation for the number of industrial mobile-use sites. As a result of LISA analysis
(shown in Figure 7c,d) for industrial mobile-use site numbers, H–H clusters are mainly
found in coastal port regions where shipbuilding, heavy industry, and chemical industries
are concentrated.
The results of spatial analysis on the number of licenses for radioactive materials reveal
the following implications. First, it is necessary to reform the current regulatory system by
reflecting
the empirical findings of the spatial analyses.(b)
Clusters with a higher concentration
(a)
of licenses for radioactive materials are mainly found in the SMA and other metropolitan
Figure 6. LISA and box plot map for the number of radioactive material licenses excluding indusareas with high population density. These regions are also home to industrial clusters,

trial use. (a) LISA map for the number of radioactive material licenses excluding industrial use; (b)
Box plot map for the number of licenses excluding industries. (Note: TLN_EX_IN = number of
radioactive material licenses excluding industries in a region.).
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A LISA map (shown in Figure 6) of the number of licenses for radioactive materials
excluding industrial licenses shows the similar geographic distribution of L–L clusters to
for the total number of licenses. On the other hand, more H–H clusters were found for the
12 of 24
number of licenses excluding industrial use than those for total licenses. In the LISA
map
excluding industrial use, there were 16 H–H clusters, mainly found in the metropolitan areas
such as Daejeon Metro, Sejong-si, and Cheongju-si (R&D centers). However, the spatial distribution of
L–Lactivities,
clusters shows
similar patterns
between
the Therefore,
two cases. it
Additionally,
centers
forthe
R&D
and large-scale
medical
facilities.
is needed tofive
establish
regional officesJinju-si,
in the identified
clusters.
KINS is located
in Daejeon Metropolitan
regions (Chuncheon-si,
Gyeongju-si,
Yuseong-gu,
and Heungdeok-gu)
appeared as
Area,
its centralized
regulatory
approaches
be inefficient
to quickly
upperand
outliers
in terms oftop–down
the number
of permits
excludingcan
industrial
use. Chuncheon-si
respond
to emergency
situations
across
addition,
it is suggestedlicenses
that thewere
localexand Jinju-si
had the highest
number
of Korea.
licensesInwhen
the industrial-use
governments’
needs
for
enhanced
safety
management
are
accommodated.
cluded, and these two regions are home to National University Hospitals.

(a)

(b)

Figure6.6.LISA
LISAand
andbox
boxplot
plotmap
map
number
of radioactive
material
licenses
excluding
indusFigure
forfor
thethe
number
of radioactive
material
licenses
excluding
industrial
trial
use.
(a)
LISA
map
for
the
number
of
radioactive
material
licenses
excluding
industrial
use. (a) LISA map for the number of radioactive material licenses excluding industrial use; (b)use;
Box(b)
Box
plot
map
for
the
number
of
licenses
excluding
industries.
(Note:
TLN_EX_IN
=
number
of
plot map for the number of licenses excluding industries. (Note: TLN_EX_IN = number of radioactive
radioactive material licenses excluding industries in a region.).
material licenses excluding industries in a region.).

The specific policy reforms and actionable items include (see Table 3):
1.
2.
3.

Establishment of regional offices of the regulatory agency, KINS, in the identified clusters;
Stepwise transfer of management authority/responsibility to local governments where
the H–H clusters are detected;
Transfer of management authority/responsibility to local governments for industrial
mobile-use sites.

Second, a better information-disclosure system with more relevant and accurate data
on radioactive materials should be developed. It is difficult to directly estimate the potential
risk of the radioactive hazard solely by the number of licenses. Therefore, it is critical to
properly manage and disclose the permitted use amount data for radioactive materials
in a transparent manner. More importantly, in the case of industrial use, data accuracy
was extremely low despite the highest share of the total use. Consequently, developing
an accurately classified (for permit and use addresses) database management system is a
necessary condition for accurate analyses for current issues, and this will serve as a base to
improve the nuclear safety regulatory governance systems.
5.2. The Amount of Permitted Use of Radioactive Materials
Since the potential radiation risk is directly affected by the amount of permitted use
rather than the number of licenses, the spatial distribution of RI use (both local and mobile)
amounts can be better indicators for the radiation risk levels in a local region. The null
hypothesis of spatial randomness cannot be rejected with the pseudo p-value of 0.354460
(>0.05) and the Moran’s I value of −0.021. Accordingly, the amount of permitted use for
radioactive materials does not show a distinctive spatial distribution pattern. Even without
spatial autocorrelation at a global level, local spatial patterns may exist, and LISA analysis
can detect them. There are two regions classified as H–L clusters: Jeongeup-si, which has
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pacity. However, the radiation risk could not be accurately analyzed with the storage capacity. However, NSSC [4] showed that the exposure accidents of workers at industrial
mobile-use sites are higher than that at the other type of facilities for a ten-year period
(2011–2020). Therefore, a spatial analysis for the number of industrial mobile-use sites was
conducted. The statistically significant and positive Moran’s I statistics of 0.165 (pseudo
13 of 24
p-value at 0.001910), as shown in Figure 7a,b, confirms the presence of spatial autocorrelation for the number of industrial mobile-use sites. As a result of LISA analysis (shown
in Figure 7c,d) for industrial mobile-use site numbers, H–H clusters are mainly found in
one
large-scale
radiation
research
institute,heavy
and Gangneung-si,
where there
is one general
coastal
port regions
where
shipbuilding,
industry, and chemical
industries
are conhospital
with
a
large-scale
radiation
permit
(see
Figure
8).
centrated.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure7.7.Moran’s
Moran’sII Test
TestStatistics,
Statistics, LISA,
LISA, and
and box
box plot
plot maps
Figure
maps for
for the
the number
number of
of RI
RImobile-use
mobile-usesites.
sites.
(a)
Moran’s
I
scatter
plot
for
the
number
of
RI
mobile-use
sites
(Moran’s
I
=
0.165);
(b)(b)
Reference
(a) Moran’s I scatter plot for the number of RI mobile-use sites (Moran’s I = 0.165);
Reference
distribution for Moran’s I (pseudo p-value = 0.001910); (c) LISA map for the number of RI mobiledistribution for Moran’s I (pseudo p-value = 0.001910); (c) LISA map for the number of RI mobile-use
use sites; (d) Box plot map for the number of RI mobile-use sites. (Note: S_RIRG_MU_ = number of
sites; (d) Box plot map for the number of RI mobile-use sites. (Note: S_RIRG_MU_ = number of RI
RI mobile-use sites in a region; lagged S_RIRG_MU_ = the average number of RI mobile-use sites
mobile-use
sites in a regions
region; lagged
S_RIRG_MU_ = the average number of RI mobile-use sites in the
in the neighboring
of a region.).
neighboring regions of a region.).
Table 3. Top 10 regions with the highest license numbers and mobile-use site numbers in Korea.
Ranking
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Total Number of Licenses

Number of Industry Licenses

Number of Mobile-Use Sites

Local Government

Number

Local Government

Number

Local Government

Number

Hwaseong-si
Danwon-gu, Ansan-si
Gangseo-gu
Gimhae-si
Siheung-si
Pyeongtaek-si
Ulju-gun
Yeosu-si
Nam-gu (Ulsan)
Yuseong-gu

457
311
294
260
243
235
211
206
202
198

Hwaseong-si
Danwon-gu, Ansan-si
Gangseo-gu
Gimhae-si
Siheung-si
Pyeongtaek-si
Ulju-gun
Yeosu-si
Nam-gu (Ulsan)
Seobuk-gu, Cheonan-si

439
296
278
249
236
218
197
195
182
169

Yeosu-si
Ulju-gun
Nam-gu (Ulsan)
Gangseo-gu
Seosan-si
Seongsan-gu, Changwon-si
Gimhae-si
Bucheon-si
Pyeongtaek-si
Geoje-si

121
88
77
54
41
39
32
32
32
30
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dioactive materials.: (a) Moran’s I Scatter Plot for the permitted use amount of radioactive materials
(Moran’s I = −0.021); (b) Reference distribution for Moran’s I (pseudo p-value = 0.354460); (c) LISA
(Moran’s
I =permitted
−0.021); (b)
distribution
Moran’s(d)
I (pseudo
= the
0.354460);
LISA
map
for the
useReference
amount of
radioactivefor
materials;
Box Plotp-value
map for
for the (c)
permap foruse
theamount
permitted
use amountmaterials.
of radioactive
materials;
(d) Box=Plot
map foruse
theamount
for the permitted
mitted
of radioactive
(Note:
TOT_L_AMT
permitted
of radiouse amount
of licenses
radioactive
(Note:
TOT_L_AMT
= permitted
use amount
of radioactive
active
material
in a materials.
region; lagged
TOT_L_AMT
= the
average permitted
use amount
of
material licenses
in alicenses
region; lagged
TOT_L_AMTregions
= the average
permitted use amount of radioactive
radioactive
material
in the neighboring
of a region).
material licenses in the neighboring regions of a region).

As mentioned earlier, for the number of licenses, the analysis for the total amount of
As mentioned
earlier, for
number
themismatch
analysis problems
for the total
of
permitted
use may mislead
thethe
results
due of
to licenses,
the spatial
of amount
industrial
permitted
use
may
mislead
the
results
due
to
the
spatial
mismatch
problems
of
industrial
use data from KINS. Accordingly, the revised permitted use amount data by excluding
useindustrial
data fromuse
KINS.
revised
permitted
use amount
data
by excluding
the
the
are Accordingly,
employed forthe
spatial
analysis.
However,
with the
Moran’s
I of −0.015
industrial
use
are
employed
for
spatial
analysis.
However,
with
the
Moran’s
I
of
−
0.015
and pseudo p-value of 0.368490 (>0.05), the spatial randomness cannot be rejected for the
and pseudo
p-value ofuse
0.368490
(>0.05),
the spatial
cannot
be rejected
for the
the
amount
of permitted
excluding
industrial
use randomness
(see Figure 9).
The LISA
map for
amount
of
permitted
use
excluding
industrial
use
(see
Figure
9).
The
LISA
map
for
the
total
total amount of radiation permits in Figure 8c still shows the presence of significant local
amount (mainly
of radiation
in Figure
8c still shows
the presence
of significant
localautocorclusters
clusters
L–L)permits
and some
local outliers
(L–H and
H–L). Global
level spatial
(mainly
L–L)
and
some
local
outliers
(L–H
and
H–L).
Global
level
spatial
autocorrelation
relation was not detected; however, a region at a local level can still be detected as a core
was not
however,
a region
at a (H–H,
local level
stillorbe
detected
as a core
region
region
fordetected;
one of the
four spatial
regions
H–L,can
L–H,
L–L).
At a global
level,
the
for
one
of
the
four
spatial
regions
(H–H,
H–L,
L–H,
or
L–L).
At
a
global
level,
the
Moran’s
Moran’s I statistic can be found to be insignificant since the different groups of spatial
I statisticatcan
be found
be as
insignificant
since
the different
of spatial
at
regimes
a local
level, to
such
clusters and
outliers,
balance groups
and wash
out the regimes
dominant
a local level, such as clusters and outliers, balance and wash out the dominant effect of
effect of one over the other. In a box plot map (Figure 9d), the upper outliers mainly
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particular,
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they are geographically
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Figure 9. Moran’s I Test Statistics, LISA and Box Plot maps for the permitted use amount of radioFigure 9. Moran’s I Test Statistics, LISA and Box Plot maps for the permitted use amount of radioactive
active materials excluding industrial use.: (a) Moran’s I Scatter Plot for the permitted use amount
materials
excluding
industrial
use.:
(a) Moran’s
I Scatter
for (b)
theReference
permitteddistribution
use amount of
of radioactive
materials
excluding
industrial
use (Moran’s
I =Plot
−0.015);
radioactive
materials
excluding
industrial
use
(Moran’s
I
=
−
0.015);
(b)
Reference
distribution
for Moran’s I (pseudo p-value = 0.368490); (c) LISA map for the permitted use amount of radioactivefor
Moran’s
(pseudo p-value
= 0.368490);
(c)Plot
LISA
map
permitted
amount
of radioactive
materialsI excluding
industrial
use; (d) Box
map
forfor
thethe
permitted
useuse
amount
of radioactive
materials excluding
TL_A_EX_IN
= permitted
use amount
of radioactive
materials
excluding industrial
industrialuse.
use;(Note:
(d) Box
Plot map for
the permitted
use amount
of radioactive
materials excluding
in a(Note:
region;TL_A_EX_IN
lagged TL_A_EX_IN
= the use
average
permitted
use
materials
excludingindustrial
industrialuse
use.
= permitted
amount
of radioactive
amount
of
radioactive
materials
excluding
industrial
use
in
the
neighboring
regions
of
a
region).
materials excluding industrial use in a region; lagged TL_A_EX_IN = the average permitted use
amount of radioactive materials excluding industrial use in the neighboring regions of a region).

While the number of licenses shows a spatial autocorrelation, the amount of permitted use
shows
Looking
at theautocorrelation,
outliers (not spatial,
just outliers
based
While
the spatial
numberrandomness.
of licenses shows
a spatial
the amount
of permitted
on the
variance
of randomness.
the variable), some
facilities
a huge
permitted
andon
use
shows
spatial
Looking
at thehave
outliers
(notamount
spatial,ofjust
outliersuse,
based
others
have no
permitted
amount.
this a
study
investigated
theuse,
upper
the
variance
of the
variable),
some Therefore,
facilities have
hugefurther
amount
of permitted
and
outlier facilities with a huge amount of permitted use in raw data (see Table 4). For this,
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upper outliers
outliers were
wereneeded.
needed.Currently,
Currently,the
the‘Nuclear
‘NuclearSafety
SafetyAct’
Act’inin
criteria for
Korea
sets
the
periodic
inspection
standards
for
radioactive
use
licenses
considering
the
Korea sets the periodic inspection standards for radioactive use licenses considering the
types
of licenses,
licenses, the
the number
number of
of permits,
permits,and
andthe
thesubjects
subjectsofofuse.
use.Based
Basedon
onthis
thisstandard,
standard,
types of
facilities
using more
more than
than 111
111TBq
TBqof
ofRI
RIare
areclassified
classifiedasashighly
highlydangerous
dangerousfacilities
facilitieswith
witha a
facilities using
high risk to human
human health.
health. As
As aa result,
result,this
thisstudy
studyperformed
performedanother
anotherspatial
spatialanalysis
analysisafter
after
excluding the
the high-risk
high-risk facilities.
facilities.
Table 4. Excluded
facilities
for industrial
outliers
with
riskswith
in Korea
(overin111
TBq).
Table
4. Excluded
facilitiesuse
forand
industrial
use
andhigh
outliers
high risks
Korea
(over 111 TBq).
Classification.
Classification

Total Licenses
Total Licenses
Industrial

Excluded
Excluded
Licenses
Licenses

Number
of Licenses
Number
of Licenses

Amount
Licenses
Amount
of of
Licenses

NumberShare
Share
Amount
(TBq) Share
Share
Number
(%) (%)Amount
(TBq)
(%)(%)

11,553
9139
Industrial
9139
Public
2
Public
2
Education and Research 10
10
Outlier
Facilities Education and Research
Outlier Facilities
Military
1
Military
1
(>111
(>111TBq)
TBq)
Medical
40
Medical
40
Non-industrial Total
53
Non-industrial Total
53
Subtotal
9192 9192
Subtotal
Total
Licenses
in Analysis
2361 2361
Total
Licenses
in Analysis
11,553

100
79.1
79.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.0 0.0
0.3 0.3
0.5
0.5
79.6 79.6
20.4 20.4
100

306,273
178,598
178,598
18,283
18,283
63,478
63,478
1597
1597
37,297
37,297
120,655
120,655
299,253
299,253
7020
7020
306,273

100
58.3
58.3
6.0
6.0
20.7
20.7
0.50.5
12.2
12.2
39.4
39.4
97.7
97.7
2.32.3
100

The spatial
spatial distribution
distributionwas
wascarried
carriedout
outfor
forthe
thepermitted
permitteduse
useofofradioactive
radioactivematerials
materials
excluding
both industrial
industrialuse
usefacilities
facilitiesand
andhigh-risk
high-riskfacilities
facilitiesover
over111
111TBq.
TBq.The
Theestimated
estimated
excluding both
Moran’s II is
is 0.105
0.105with
withaapseudo
pseudop-value
p-valueofof0.008350
0.008350
(<0.05),
shown
in Figure
With
(<0.05),
as as
shown
in Figure
10. 10.
With
a
and
significant
Moran’s
I value,
thethe
nullnull
hypothesis
of spatial
randomness
can be
apositive
positive
and
significant
Moran’s
I value,
hypothesis
of spatial
randomness
can
rejected.
Alternatively,
spatial
clusters
(both
H–HH–H
and and
L–L)L–L)
are found
to be to
thebedominant
be
rejected.
Alternatively,
spatial
clusters
(both
are found
the domitypes
of
spatial
regions
for
the
identified
spatial
autocorrelation.
nant types of spatial regions for the identified spatial autocorrelation.

(a)

(b)

Figure
10. Moran’s
Moran’s II test
test statistics
statistics for
for the
the permitted
permitteduse
useamount
amountof
ofradioactive
radioactivematerials
materialsexcluding
excluding
Figure 10.
both industrial use and high-risk facilities. (a) Moran’s I scatter plot for the permitted use amount
both industrial use and high-risk facilities. (a) Moran’s I scatter plot for the permitted use amount
of radioactive materials excluding both industrial use and high-risk facilities (Moran’s I = 0.105);
of radioactive materials excluding both industrial use and high-risk facilities (Moran’s I = 0.105);
(b) Reference distribution for Moran’s I (pseudo p-value = 0.008350). (Note: TAexIND_KI = permit(b) Reference distribution for Moran’s I (pseudo p-value = 0.008350). (Note: TAexIND_KI = permitted
ted use amount of radioactive materials excluding both industrial use and high-risk facilities in a
use amount
of radioactive
materials
excluding
both industrial
use and
high-risk facilities
in aexcludregion;
region;
lagged
TAexIND_KI
= the average
permitted
use amount
of radioactive
materials
lagged
TAexIND_KI
=
the
average
permitted
use
amount
of
radioactive
materials
excluding
both
ing both industrial use and high-risk facilities in the neighboring regions of a region.).
industrial use and high-risk facilities in the neighboring regions of a region.).

LISA determines the location and significance level of clusters and outliers not found
in a global spatial autocorrelation test using Moran’s I statistic. LISA tests were used for
the presence of spatial clusters and spatial outliers for each region between the amount of
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(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure11.
11.LISA
LISA and
and Box
Box Plot
use
amount
excluding
both
industrial
use use
Figure
Plot maps
mapsfor
forthe
thepermitted
permitted
use
amount
excluding
both
industrial
and high-risk facilities.: (a) LISA maps for the permitted use amount excluding both industrial use
and high-risk facilities.: (a) LISA maps for the permitted use amount excluding both industrial use
and high-risk facilities; (b) Box Plot maps for the permitted use amount excluding both industrial
and high-risk facilities; (b) Box Plot maps for the permitted use amount excluding both industrial
use and high-risk facilities; (c) Box Plot maps for the permitted use amount medical use. (Note:
use
and high-risk
facilities;use
(c)amount
Box Plot
for thematerials
permitted
use amount
medical use.
(Note:
TAexIND_KI
= permitted
ofmaps
radioactive
excluding
both industrial
use and
TAexIND_KI
= permitted
use amount
of radioactive
materials
excluding
both industrial
use
high-risk facilities
in a region;
MED_L_AMT
= permitted
use amount
of radioactive
material
forand
high-risk
in a region; MED_L_AMT = permitted use amount of radioactive material for
medical facilities
use in a region).
medical use in a region).

The implications of spatial analysis of permitted use amount for radioactive materials
are as follows. It is recommended to revisit the current regulatory system in consideration
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The implications of spatial analysis of permitted use amount for radioactive materials
are as follows. It is recommended to revisit the current regulatory system in consideration
of the radiation use permit amounts of the facilities and their geographic distribution
among the 244 regions in Korea. Except for the 53 high-risk facilities with a huge amount of
use permits, non-industrial radiation use permit shows a distinctive spatial autocorrelation
(see Table 5). It is necessary to keep the current regulatory governance system for the
high-risk facilities that have permitted use licenses above a certain standard (111 MBq).
However, it would enhance the efficiency of the current safety regulation system if KINS
establishes regional centers (regional offices) in the five geographic Divisions: the SMA
Division, Chungcheong Division, Gyeongsang Division, Jeolla Division, and Gangwon
Division based on the findings in this study.
Table 5. Top ten regions with the highest radioactive material use amount in Korea.
Excluding Industry

Region

Amt.

Region

Amt.

Region

Amt.

Region

Amt.

1

Yeoju-si

74,370

Yuseong-gu

47,102

Yeoju-si

74,000

Ilsandong-gu,
Goyang-si

268

2

Yuseong-gu

63,724

Gangneung-si

25,933

Hwaseong-si

29,230

Bundang-gu,
Seongnam-si

256

3

Hwaseong-si

30,377

Gyeongju-si

18,225

Gangneung-si

25,921

Seongbuk-gu

248

4

Gangneung-si

25,933

Jeongeup-si

17,601

Yuseong-gu

22,641

Seo-gu
(Busan)

229

5

Gyeongju-si

18,229

Jongno-gu

1619

Gyeongju-si

18,130

Namdong-gu

223

6

Jeongeup-si

17,849

Nowon-gu

1388

Jeongeup-si

17,587

Dong-gu
(Gwangju)

187

7

Gijang-gun

15,175

Gangnam-gu

1093

Gijang-gun

14,800

Jung-gu
(Daejeon)

177

8

Jongno-gu

13,498

Songpa-gu

1020

Yuseong-gu

14,467

Gangdong-gu

172

9

Seocho-gu

5794

Seodaemun-gu

659

Jongno-gu

11,470

Bucheon-si

150

10

Gangnam-gu

4523

Bundang-gu,
Seongnam-si

548

Yuseong-gu

11,174

Chuncheon-si

148

Rank

1 Facility Permit

>111 TBq Facility
Excluded

Total Amount (TBq)

The detailed types of radioactive material licenses can be divided into production, sale,
use, and mobile use of radioactive isotopes (NSSC, 2021). Among them, permission for use
has a relatively high degree of risk depending on the specific amount of permission and
the characteristics of continuous use. Reflecting on this, we analyzed the permitted amount
for use. In particular, mobile usage data that contributed to industry data inaccuracies are
automatically excluded here. Therefore, the results of this analysis are meaningful. Moran’s
I for the permitted amount of the license for use is −0.012. The null hypothesis of spatial
randomness cannot be rejected with the pseudo p-value of 0.361910 (>0.05). Accordingly,
the amount of permitted use for radioactive materials does not show a distinctive spatial
distribution pattern.
Even without the spatial autocorrelation at the global level, local spatial patterns may
exist, and LISA analysis can detect them, as found in the case of the H–L cluster of the LISA
map, Jeongeup-si, which has a radiation research institution, and Gangneung-si, where
a hospital with a large-scale radiation use permit is located. The spatial distribution of
permitted uses of licensed facilities can also be found in Figure 12a. The outliers in this
map have characteristics similar to the distribution of Figure 11b,c.
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Facilities with a huge permitted use amount should be intensively and directly managed by KINS (a centralized regulatory agency), as is the case with the current
regulatory system.
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Figure 12.
12. LISA
LISA and
and Box
Box Plot
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amount
of
the
license
for
use;
(b)
Box
Plot
maps
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amount
of
the
for the permitted amount of the license for use; (b) Box Plot maps for the permitted amount of the
license
for
use.
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RI_C_RIU_A
=
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use
amount
of
RI
use
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and
permit
combined
license for use. (Note: RI_C_RIU_A = permitted use amount of RI use report and permit combined in
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a region).

5.3.
in the
the Regulatory
RegulatorySystem
Systemand
andImplementation
ImplementationMethods
Methods
5.3. Basis
Basis for
for Changes
Changes in
As
empirical analyses,
analyses,radioactive
radioactivematerials
materialsare
aredistributed
distributed
throughout
As found
found in
in the
the empirical
throughout
Korea.
thesafety
safetymanagement
management
and
emergency
response
incurrent
the current
system
Korea. However,
However, the
and
emergency
response
in the
system
are
are
not
efficient.
It
is
not
ideal
for
KINS
to
perform
all
on-site
inspections
across
the
counnot efficient. It is not ideal for KINS to perform all on-site inspections across the country.
try.
As have
we have
in other
countries,
an inspection
of radioactive
material
by cenAs we
seenseen
in other
countries,
an inspection
of radioactive
material
only only
by centraltral-government-level
regulatory
agencies
(e.g., in
NRC
in the United
States
and
government-level regulatory
agencies
(e.g., NRC
the United
States and
NSSC
in NSSC
Korea)in
Korea)
is not optimal.
always optimal.
theinformation
lack of information
on local radioactive
material
is not always
With theWith
lack of
on local radioactive
material facilities,
facilities,
local governments
have
limitedfor
capacity
for emergency
Additionally,
local governments
have limited
capacity
emergency
responses. responses.
Additionally,
in certain
cases,
it takes
too
several
hours)
forhours)
KINS experts
to experts
arrive attothe
site with
in
certain
cases,
it long
takes(up
tooto
long
(up to
several
for KINS
arrive
at thean
site
emergency
situation
and
control
it.
Therefore,
the
current
system
only
controlled
by
KINS
with an emergency situation and control it. Therefore, the current system only controlled
poses
serious
limitations
for the efficient
initial
response
to response
radiation exposure
of workers
by
KINS
poses
serious limitations
for the
efficient
initial
to radiation
exposure
orworkers
local residents.
of
or local residents.
In order
order to
to transfer
transfer the
to to
In
the authority
authorityand
andresponsibility
responsibilityfor
foron-site
on-sitesafety
safetymanagement
management
local
governments,
technology
transfer
is
an
essential
first
step.
If
new
regional
offices
of
local governments, technology transfer is an essential first step. If new regional offices of
KINS can
can be
be established
established across
technology
KINS
across Korea,
Korea,they
theywill
willbe
bethe
theKINS’
KINS’local
localbases
basesforfor
technology
transfer
to
the
partnering
local
governments.
transfer to the partnering local governments.
Under the current regulatory system by the monopolistic regulatory agency, KINS, in
Under the current regulatory system by the monopolistic regulatory agency, KINS,
Korea, the disadvantages of inefficiency surpass, by far, the advantages of specialization.
in Korea, the disadvantages of inefficiency surpass, by far, the advantages of specializaFor this reason, it is recommended to transfer on-site inspections to local governments.
tion. For this reason, it is recommended to transfer on-site inspections to local governments. In order to transfer the safety inspection authority/responsibility to the local governments, the KINS should share its accumulated safety management technologies and
specialized experience with the local governments. Consequently, the first step for the
regulatory policy reform process would be to establish regional offices that serve as re-
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In order to transfer the safety inspection authority/responsibility to the local governments,
the KINS should share its accumulated safety management technologies and specialized
experience with the local governments. Consequently, the first step for the regulatory
policy reform process would be to establish regional offices that serve as regional centers
for regulatory technology transfer and effective on-site safety management.
To find the best available locations for the proposed KINS regional offices, various
factors should be considered, including accessibility, population distribution, and the
spatial distribution patterns of hazardous, radioactive materials found in this study. The
regions with the extremely high permit amount (identified as upper outliers in box plot map
in Figure 11b) are selected and suggested as the candidate locations for regional centers,
and these regions are listed in Table 6.
Table 6. Six KINS regional office candidate locations with their permitted use amounts.
Geographic
Division

SMA

Chungcheong
Gyeongsang
Jeolla
Gangwon

Candidate Locations
Region
Ilsandong-gu,
Goyang-si
Bundang-gu,
Seongnam-si
Jung-gu, Daejeon
Seo-gu, Busan
Dong-gu, Gwangju
Chuncheon-si

Amount (in TBq)

Note

268

SMA—North

256

SMA—South

186
229
187
150

KINS Main Office
-

For each of the five geographic divisions of Korea, a location for KINS’ regional
center is determined, taking into account the permitted use amount, accessibility to remote
regions from the proposed centers, and population distribution of each division. From
the proposed regional office locations, the response time of KINS local emergency teams
can be greatly shortened, and more efficient management of the emergency situation is
expected. As shown in Table 6, KINS’ regional offices will be established in the SMA
Division, Chungcheong Division, Gyeongsang Division, Jeolla Division, and Gangwon
Division. A specific location for each geographic division is mainly determined based on
the spatial distribution of the permitted use amount. Additionally, other factors, such as
accessibility and population distribution of each division, are used. The SMA Division,
where over 25 million (over half of the total Korean population) live, needs to be subdivided
into two regional offices, North and South, in consideration of areal size and population
density. Additionally, a regional office in Chungcheong Division can be co-located within
the KINS main office.
6. Conclusions
The first goal of nuclear safety regulatory bodies around the world is to protect public
health from radiation risks from the use of nuclear power and radioactive materials. The
elected officials of a local government should be concerned about the health and safety of the
local residents (constituents of the local region). A central nuclear safety regulatory agency
in Korea, KINS, takes one-size-fits-all approaches for managing the safety of radioactive
materials in accordance with uniform standards regardless of their locations. However,
this is inefficient to manage all the facilities subject to regulations that are continuously
increasing as the industry develops. For the 244 regions in Korea, the spatial analysis in
this study identified the spatial distribution patterns for the number of RI licenses and
the permitted amount of RI use in Korea. A large geographic variation in the permitted
amount of RI use was found. However, the centralized regulatory agency, KINS, has been
in charge of safety management in a top–down approach failing to meet the local needs.
Considering many other countries’ cases and local governments’ vested interest in safety
management, it is recommended to initiate new governance for safety management.
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The number of licenses for radioactive materials shows spatial autocorrelation. The
H–H cluster was formed around the metropolitan areas and other densely populated
regions with industrial clusters in Korea. Regions with low population density and a
higher share of the elderly population in mountainous or agricultural areas showed the
concentration of L–L clusters. In the case of industrial licenses, which account for 78.7% of
the number of licenses, there were spatial mismatch problems between the license location
(usually headquarter addresses) and the actual location where radioactive materials were
in use, so licenses for industrial use had to be dropped from this study for spatial analysis.
Additionally, above all else, the number of licenses could not be used to determine the
magnitude of the potential radioactive hazard. However, regulators say that the number
of RI-licensed establishments has been increasing annually in recent years, requiring
additional technical support. Findings in this study clearly demonstrate that the number of
licensed facilities alone cannot be used as an indicator for the level of potential risk from the
licensed facilities. Therefore, in this study, spatial analysis was extended for the permitted
amount of RI (or radioactive materials) use. The number of total licenses shows a spatial
autocorrelation, while the total amount of permitted use shows spatial randomness. As a
result, this study performed another spatial analysis after excluding the high-risk facilities.
For the spatial analysis excluding these facilities, a spatial autocorrelation was found in the
permitted use amount. In LISA tests for the presence of spatial clusters, the H–H clusters
were only found in the SMA with a high amount of medical use permits and Yuseong-gu
of the Deajeon metropolitan area with a strong presence of public R&D activities.
Through the process of spatial analysis of RI permits, a reform in the regulatory system
was suggested in consideration of the huge amount of permits for some licenses and the
total amount of permits by regions. If the total amount in the region is less than 111 TBq,
the regulatory technology is transferred to the region first, and the local government in
the region conducts an on-site inspection. In areas over 111 TBq, safety management is
implemented by creating a cooperative system between relevant local governments and the
regulatory agency, KINS. During that time, KINS continues to enforce safety regulations
with a permit amount of 111 TBq or more. However, KINS maintains the authority to
regulate safety if necessary for safety among licensed facilities with a permit amount of
111 TBq or more. The authority and responsibility to regulate mobile workplaces will also
be transferred to local governments and implemented locally. As such, it was necessary
to improve the radiation safety regulation governance. In the long term, the inspection of
radioactive materials should be transferred to local governments, and KINS should focus
on advancing safety technology, preparing safety standards, and conducting safety reviews.
This study selected the candidate locations for six regional offices of KINS for geographic divisions in Korea. The recommended candidate locations should be carefully
reviewed in collaboration with the local governments. Through the new regional offices,
KINS transfers the accumulated regulatory technology to local governments and establishes a strong collaboration system with regions that can respond more effectively to
emergency situations. Additionally, regional offices provide safety technology consulting
to local licensees.
Among the information managed by KINS, the permit location and the actual place
of use are often different. Additionally, as in the case of a relatively very high permit
amount in a specific hospital, it is necessary to review the approval standard for the permit
amount again.
In addition, it is absolutely critical to classify the types of licenses and the amount
of permitted use in information disclosure to the public via easily accessible platforms.
In addition, through the improved information sharing system, radiation risks and safety
management systems should be fully disclosed to the public in a form that local residents
can easily grasp. The spatial analysis results in this study can effectively visualize the
distribution patterns of potential sources of radioactive hazards through mapping, and this
will play an important role in more effective two-way communication between regulatory
agencies and local residents [8].
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Like many other empirical studies, this study is also far from perfection. The analysis
in this study is not comprehensive due to the data-inaccuracy problems embedded in the
raw data from KINS, especially with the permit for industrial use. Additionally, this study
aims to suggest viable paths for the policy reform in radioactive safety regulations rather
than a set of specific technological standards/specifications for management. That is why
extended discussion with scientists, technicians, and other experts with practical experience
should follow, and this will develop the technical standards/specifications about how the
newly suggested policy reforms can be effectively implemented on site.
Spatial Analysis on Radiation Hazards in South Korea has rarely been studied, and the
data are largely limited in public use. Understanding the spatial distribution of potential
sources of radioactive isotopes in Korea is the first step to analyzing the potential risk among
the local governments in Korea. This study is meaningful in that it suggests the need for
many countries around the world to properly disclose information on radioactive materials.
Utilizing the spatial analysis results found in this study, the effectiveness of radiation risk
management can be enhanced through collaborative policy development between central
regulatory agencies and local stakeholders. The newly recommended governance model
in this study can improve the safety management of radioactive materials that are around
people’s daily lives through effective cooperation with local governments in practice. In the
future, it is necessary to study the spatial analysis of radioactive materials by synthesizing
accurate data on the number of licenses and permit amounts of industrial use. Using
complete and accurate data will help to develop a better governance model for Korea’s
radiation safety regulatory system. This research method can also be applied to other
countries’ cases as well.
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